
Jobs-Plus

Lessons from the Evaluation: An Overview

**James A. Riccio
MDRC**

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Origins of Jobs-Plus—poverty and place

Build mixed-income communities “from within”

- Response to growing concentration of joblessness, underemployment, welfare receipt, and poverty in public housing and surrounding neighborhoods

Public and private sponsors:

- US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
- The Rockefeller Foundation
- Other public and private funders

Why 3 components + saturation?

Past evidence from welfare reform led to:

- Employment and training component
- “Make work pay” component

Growing appreciation of social capital led to:

- Community support for work

Anticipated synergy from 3 together

Saturation

- Derived from community change goal
- Hypothesized a possible “tipping point” effect
- Expected to give further boost to the 3 components

Jobs-Plus sites

Diverse housing developments in 6 cities:

Baltimore

Chattanooga

Dayton

Los Angeles

St. Paul

Seattle

Randomly allocated developments within each city to program and control groups

Local partnerships and collaboration:

- Public housing agencies
- Welfare agencies
- Workforce agencies
- Residents

- Other service agencies



**Mandatory
partners**

Why not just a PHA program?

- Constituents of **welfare** and **workforce** agencies live in public housing
- Hence, these agencies = **natural stakeholders**, with good reasons to cooperate and invest
- Welfare and workforce agencies had **workforce expertise and resources**
- **Resident leaders**: Could lend knowledge of the community and credibility to the intervention

Examples of collaboration

- Partners joined **governing/advisory boards** for Jobs-Plus (though most resisted a broad *governance* role)
- Some non-housing agencies **out-stationed frontline workers** at Jobs-Plus developments
- Non-housing agencies joined Jobs-Plus **service networks**
- Welfare agencies counted participation in Jobs-Plus as **meeting TANF requirements**, helping Jobs-Plus engage welfare recipients

3 sites allowed “full test” of JP concept

Dayton, Los Angeles, and St. Paul: Positive effects

- Offered and sustained the full Jobs-Plus “package”
- Strong housing authority commitment
- ~ 3/4 working-age residents took advantage of services, rent incentives
- Infused development with self-sufficiency message

Seattle: Positive short-term positive effects

- Early exit from demo because of reconstruction

Baltimore and Chattanooga: No effects


- Incomplete implementation

1998 cohort = focus of impact analysis


- All **nondisabled working-age** residents
- Living in Jobs-Plus or comparison developments in **October 1998** (*random assignment of developments*)
- Includes **recent arrivals and longer-termers** in 1998
- Includes those who **moved or stayed** after 1998
- Long-term **comparative interrupted-time series analysis**, using Unemployment Insurance wage records
- *Sample size:*

<u>Program</u>	<u>Comparison</u>	<u>Total</u>
2,123	2,651	4,774


Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)



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
Earnings impacts through 7 years

(full implementation sites)

Site	Avg. per year (2000 - 2006)	Cumulative (2000 - 2006)	Change (%)
Pooled	\$1,300	\$9,099	16%
Dayton	\$984	\$6,888	14%
Los Angeles	\$1,176	\$8,233	15%
St. Paul	\$1,883	\$13,181	19%

All results statistically significant

Impacts on average earnings/year, by site and follow-up period



Sites with problematic implementation

Seattle: Good, but became HOPE VI site

- Well implemented but not sustained – disrupted by relocation/reconstruction

2 “weak implementation” sites:

- **Baltimore:** - Low incentives use/poor administration
 - Retrenchment in services and funding
 - Changing PHA leadership/priorities
- **Chattanooga:** - Floundered
 - PHA attention diverted by transition to privatization of PHA management
 - “Incentives-only” in 2002 (but low use)

Impacts at the “development level”

Difference in average earnings in Jobs-Plus vs. control developments for residents living in the developments in a given year

- With some residents moving out and new ones moving in, “sample” can differ from one year to next

It’s possible to have an impact at *individual level* and no impact at *development level*

- If residents who increase their earnings are more likely to move out and are replaced by residents with lower or no earnings

Development-level findings

In sites with lower resident mobility, more of the individual-level earnings gains “stay in the development”

Development-level impacts on earnings (2000-2003):

Los Angeles (<i>tight housing market</i>):	23%
St. Paul (<i>tight housing market</i>):	15%
Dayton (<i>softer housing market</i>):	9%

Thus, in *tighter* housing markets, Jobs-Plus can help deconcentrate poverty “from within”

In *softer* housing markets, can function as “launch pad”

Replicating Jobs-Plus in NYC and San Antonio

Challenges encountered

- Staffing turnover and appropriateness
- EID as the incentives component
- Engaging housing managers
- Establishing a strong on-site presence and identity when using vendor approach (NYC)
- Balancing “saturation” and “membership in JP”
- More limited collaboration (esp. in SAHA)

SIF Replication *(continued)*

Accomplishments

- Broad reach (enrolled 50 – 70% of working-age, non-disabled residents)
- Growing engagement
- Growing local enthusiasm for model
- Improving outcomes

New implementation report: Fall 2015