Jobs-Plus

Lessons from the Evaluation:
An Overview

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Origins of Jobs-Plus—poverty and place

Build mixed-income communities “from within”

- Response to growing concentration of joblessness, underemployment, welfare receipt, and poverty in public housing and surrounding neighborhoods

Public and private sponsors:

- US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
- The Rockefeller Foundation
- Other public and private funders
Why 3 components + saturation?

Past evidence from welfare reform led to:
- Employment and training component
- “Make work pay” component

Growing appreciation of social capital led to:
- Community support for work

Anticipated synergy from 3 together

Saturation
- Derived from community change goal
- Hypothesized a possible “tipping point” effect
- Expected to give further boost to the 3 components
Diverse housing developments in 6 cities:

- Baltimore
- Chattanooga
- Dayton
- Los Angeles
- St. Paul
- Seattle

Randomly allocated developments within each city to program and control groups

Local partnerships and collaboration:

- Public housing agencies
- Welfare agencies
- Workforce agencies
- Residents
- Other service agencies

Mandatory partners
Why not just a PHA program?

• Constituents of welfare and workforce agencies live in public housing

• Hence, these agencies = natural stakeholders, with good reasons to cooperate and invest

• Welfare and workforce agencies had workforce expertise and resources

• Resident leaders: Could lend knowledge of the community and credibility to the intervention
Examples of collaboration

- Partners joined *governing/advisory boards* for Jobs-Plus (though most resisted a broad *governance* role)

- Some non-housing agencies *out-stationed frontline workers* at Jobs-Plus developments

- Non-housing agencies joined Jobs-Plus *service networks*

- Welfare agencies counted participation in Jobs-Plus as *meeting TANF requirements*, helping Jobs-Plus engage welfare recipients
3 sites allowed “full test” of JP concept

Dayton, Los Angeles, and St. Paul: Positive effects

- Offered and sustained the full Jobs-Plus “package”
- Strong housing authority commitment
- ~3/4 working-age residents took advantage of services, rent incentives
- Infused development with self-sufficiency message

Seattle: Positive short-term positive effects

- Early exit from demo because of reconstruction

Baltimore and Chattanooga: No effects

- Incomplete implementation
1998 cohort = focus of impact analysis

- All *nondisabled working-age* residents
- Living in Jobs-Plus or comparison developments in **October 1998** *(random assignment of developments)*
- Includes *recent arrivals and longer-termers* in 1998
- Includes those who *moved or stayed* after 1998
- Long-term *comparative interrupted-time series analysis*, using Unemployment Insurance wage records

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**Sample size:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>4,774</td>
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Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)

Mean Quarterly Earnings (in 2003 dollars)

Time Period

Q1 1992, Q1 1993, Q1 1994, Q1 1995, Q1 1996, Q1 1997, Q1 1998, Q1 1999, Q1 2000, Q1 2001, Q1 2002, Q1 2003, Q1 2004, Q1 2005, Q1 2006

Comparison Group

Roll-out period

Full program period

Post-program period
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)

Mean Quarterly Earnings (in 2003 dollars)

- Jobs-Plus Group
- Comparison Group

Time Period

Roll-out period

Full program period

Post-program period
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort *(full implementation sites)*

**Figure 1**

Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample: 3 sites pooled
### Earnings impacts through 7 years
*(full implementation sites)*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
<td>$1,300</td>
<td>$9,099</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>$984</td>
<td>$6,888</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$1,176</td>
<td>$8,233</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>$1,883</td>
<td>$13,181</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All results statistically significant
Impacts on average earnings/year, by site and follow-up period

- **St. Paul**: $1,479 (Full program period) $1,479 (Post-program period)
- **Los Angeles**: $1,276 (Full program period) $1,276 (Post-program period)
- **Dayton**: $907 (Full program period) $907 (Post-program period)
- **Seattle**: $833 (Full program period) $833 (Post-program period)
- **Baltimore**: $-189 (Post-program period)
- **Chattanooga**: $-224 (Post-program period)

Legend:
- Blue: Post-program period (2004 - 2006)

Note:
- Weak delivery

Graphical representation:
- Vertical bars showing earnings differences for each site.
Sites with problematic implementation

Seattle: Good, but became HOPE VI site

- Well implemented but not sustained – disrupted by relocation/reconstruction

2 “weak implementation” sites:

- **Baltimore**: - Low incentives use/poor administration
  - Retrenchment in services and funding
  - Changing PHA leadership/priorities

- **Chattanooga**: - Floundered
  - PHA attention diverted by transition to privatization of PHA management
  - “Incentives-only” in 2002 (but low use)
Impacts at the “development level”

Difference in average earnings in Jobs-Plus vs. control developments for residents living in the developments in a given year

- With some residents moving out and new ones moving in, “sample” can differ from one year to next

It’s possible to have an impact at individual level and no impact at development level

- If residents who increase their earnings are more likely to move out and are replaced by residents with lower or no earnings
Development-level findings

In sites with lower resident mobility, more of the individual-level earnings gains “stay in the development”


- **Los Angeles** *(tight housing market)*: 23%
- **St. Paul** *(tight housing market)*: 15%
- **Dayton** *(softer housing market)*: 9%

Thus, in *tighter* housing markets, Jobs-Plus can help deconcentrate poverty “from within”

In *softer* housing markets, can function as “launch pad”
Replicating Jobs-Plus in NYC and San Antonio

Challenges encountered

• Staffing turnover and appropriateness
• EID as the incentives component
• Engaging housing managers
• Establishing a strong on-site presence and identity when using vendor approach (NYC)
• Balancing “saturation” and “membership in JP”
• More limited collaboration (esp. in SAHA)
Accomplishments

• Broad reach (enrolled 50 – 70% of working-age, non-disabled residents)
• Growing engagement
• Growing local enthusiasm for model
• Improving outcomes

New implementation report: Fall 2015