10. WHY PLANNING? It would be misleading to attempt to prescribe a standardized set of specific security measures for all of the enormous variety of HUD-assisted multifamily housing projects throughout the nation. For that very practical reason, this Handbook eschews a simplistic "how-to-do-it" approach. In each instance, the security program should be tailored to the unique set of needs and constraints which pertain to the particular project and its residents. This makes careful project-by-project planning imperative and, as noted in Chapter 2 above, such planning should be the primary responsibility of Management. Although this imposes a heavy burden upon Management, the time and effort invested in planning yields high dividends, whereas action without thorough planning risks waste, frustration, and even deterioration of project security.

11. BASIC PLANNING PROCESS. While no standardized result, in terms of specific security measures, can be recommended, a relatively standardized methodology for the planning process itself can be validly prescribed. The principles of security planning are much like those which are familiar to Management from its planning of other aspects of housing operations. Whatever the circumstances, the same basic planning process is recommended: Make a preliminary estimate; obtain and analyze the facts; build alliances; make decisions; assemble resources; evaluate and modify on a continuing basis. For the small project, this process can be telescoped into a relatively simple and speedy effort. For large projects, highly-structured planning may be necessary. Subject to such adaptations, however, the process is essentially the same for all projects.

12. DETAILED STEPS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS. The following is a step-by-step guide to the process of security planning, and can be readily adapted to the circumstances of each particular project:

a. Preliminary Estimate. At the outset, Management (with the assistance of other key participants) should make a preliminary estimate of problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. This estimate must be completed quickly, and will thus be merely in the nature of a rough appraisal. It should, however, point a definite direction for further planning. The following procedure is recommended for preparing the preliminary estimate:

(1) Staff Estimate. First of all, Management staff should prepare (in written format) its best estimate of
problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. This estimate should be based upon such information as is readily available to Management staff.

(2) Policy Input. The staff estimate should then be submitted to appropriate policy-level Management officials (LHA Board of Commissioners or executives of the private owner and managing agent) for their preliminary guidance. This can avoid unnecessary or mistaken effort later in the planning process.

(3) Resident Input. Next, the staff estimate (as revised after policy input) should be submitted to the residents' organization for its review and suggestions. At the least, quick resident input at this point will serve to indicate the major concerns of residents and identify options which are clearly unacceptable to residents. This step will also serve to bring the residents' organization into early partnership with Management.

(4) Revised Estimate. After the foregoing steps are completed, Management staff should attempt to reconcile all inputs and prepare a revised estimate which will include a detailed planning agenda. This agenda should specify all remaining tasks, and persons responsible for each. It should be recognized, however, that changes in the agenda will probably be necessary as further planning proceeds.

b. Obtaining and Analyzing the Facts. Perhaps the most common defect in residential security programs is the implementation of protective measures without first ascertaining the exact nature and degree of the project's security problems. All too often, Managers have installed expensive systems for hardware, lighting, electronic surveillance, or security personnel without an accurate assessment of the probable effectiveness of such measures against particular types of offenses. Severe problems sometimes dictate action before all of the facts can be gathered and analyzed, but even quick response must be based upon the best factual estimate which can be made in the time available. See paragraph 14 below. The following procedure is recommended here:

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(1) The fullest possible investigation should be made of the facts bearing upon security problems, resources, and constraints. See paragraph 13 below for suggestions as to specific factual inquiries. Methods of conducting the investigation may differ with circumstances. In a small
In a large project, the use of qualified specialists and elaborate investigative techniques (e.g., questionnaires, examination of police statistics, in-depth interviews of residents and project Management staff) may be necessary.

(2) Analysis of the raw factual data will then enable Management to determine the relative importance of the various factual elements discovered, and the relationships among those elements. Much of this can be done as investigation proceeds, but some overall analysis should be reserved until the factual picture is virtually complete.

c. Building Alliances. Early in the planning process, Management should begin to build working alliances with the other three key participants, plus any other parties whose assistance and support are desired. Since the fact-finding phase involves considerable interaction with other participants, it provides excellent opportunities to cement these alliances. Each participant's role, and the resources needed from each, should be discussed fully.

d. Making Decisions. Factual analysis merges automatically into decisions on the final content of the security program. With a thorough factual base, Management can make well-reasoned decisions as to the set of specific security measures which best meet the needs and constraints identified. It is recommended that, even in the small project, the security program finally adopted be put into written format, and copies distributed to appropriate Management personnel and to each of the other key participants. The following matters should be considered at this point in the planning process:

(1) Policy-Level Ratifications. The final security program should be ratified by appropriate policy-level Management officials (e.g., the LHA Board of Commissioners or executives of the owner and managing agent). In addition to the procedural necessity for obtaining proper authorization, this step serves to sharpen such officials' awareness of, and involvement in, the program.

(2) Concurrence of Other Key Participants. While Management is entitled to insist upon its due prerogatives as to decisions affecting project security, as a practical matter other key participants must have a strong voice in major decisions. Most protective measures will prove ineffective without the support of residents and the Police Department. It may be wise to have the residents' organization give its formal endorsement of the plan. To the extent that outside resources are needed to implement the plan, concurrence must, of course, be obtained from the
organizations controlling those resources.

(3) Goals. The plan should set forth realistic goals, with order of priority and reasonable target dates. Short-term goals are the most amenable to detailed definition at the outset, but longer-term goals should be projected as far in the future and with as much specificity as is consistent with realism.

e. Assembling Resources. To the extent that desired security measures depend upon non-Management resources, definite commitments must be obtained before final decisions can be made on the security plan. It is preferable to complete this task during the fact-gathering step. However, where major funding is to be requested, it is ordinarily necessary to prepare a detailed proposal before a commitment can be obtained. If phased action over a long period of time is planned, it may be possible to postpone assemblage of resources necessary for later phases. In any event, Management should be prepared to make changes dictated by the actual availability of resources.

f. Evaluation and Modification. Management's planning function should not stop when implementation of the security program begins. On the contrary, no program should be regarded as indefinitely fixed. Throughout the implementation phase, Management (again with the assistance of other key participants) should carry on continued evaluation and modification of the security program, in order to keep abreast of changing conditions.

13. FACTUAL INQUIRIES. For the full factual investigation described in subparagraph 12b(1) above, the following are questions which should ordinarily be answered in as much detail as possible (this list is not necessarily exhaustive):

a. What Is the History of Crime in the Project? The fullest possible information should be obtained on specific types of offenses (completed and attempted) over the recent past. See subparagraph 5b(1) above. The Police Department and/or the local Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) may be able to assist in compiling these data.

b. What Are the Relevant Characteristics of Offenders and Victims? Factors bearing on motivation of offenders and vulnerability of victims, in regard to specific types of offenses, should be explored. The ages of both offenders and victims are important here. In addition, the extent to which offenses are the work of residents or nonresidents should be determined.
c. What Are the Probable Future Trends of Crime and Vandalism Within the Project? Opinions of law enforcement, correctional and social services professionals are especially valuable here, but Management should give independent weight to indications from the data produced by its other inquiries. This projection should be broken down by specific types of offenses. See subparagraph 5b(1) above.

d. What Are the Relevant Characteristics of the Surrounding Neighborhood? Of primary interest here is identification of the nature, incidence, and trends of crime in the immediate neighborhood, as these data affect the project and its residents. Facts about neighborhood facilities and services are also pertinent here.

e. What are the Relevant Social Forces at Work in the Larger Community? Such factors as economic trends, illegal drug traffic, migration patterns, racial tensions, land development, and general public attitudes should be considered for their implications for project security.

f. What Characteristics of the Project's Residents Contribute to the Encouragement or Deterrence of Crime and Vandalism? Both positive and negative factors (e.g., those related to family stability, age, income, employment, racial discrimination, and social attitudes) should be assessed. See especially paragraphs 38 and 39 below.

h. What Specific Physical Characteristics of the Project's Buildings and Grounds Contribute to the Encouragement or Deterrence of Crime and Vandalism? Site layout, landscaping, structural design, equipment, lighting, and hardware are among the elements which should be studied. On this point, there is no substitute for a thorough inspection of the property by a qualified expert on the architectural aspects of security. See Chapter 4 below.

i. What Are the Nature and Quality of Police Department Services to the Project and its Residents? In addition to information from the Police Department itself, residents' views and independent Management evaluation should be considered. See paragraphs 27 through 30 below.

j. What Are the Nature and Quality of Other Protective Services Within the Project? Existing security personnel (e.g., Management and tenant patrols, lobby monitors, contract guards) and other "software" measures already in operation should be evaluated in terms of cost-effectiveness. See paragraphs 31 through 35 and Chapters 6 through 8 below.
k. How Do General Management Policies and Practices Affect
   Security? Among matters for exploration here are existing
   conditions regarding organization, staffing, training,
   administration, maintenance, occupancy policies, and
   Management-resident relations. See especially Chapter 6
   below.

l. What is the Potential of the Residents' Organization for
   Assisting with a Security Program? See Chapter 6 below.

m. To What Extent Does Management Have In-House Technical
   Capabilities in Security?

n. What Additional Technical Assistance Is Needed and How Can It
   Be Obtained? See paragraphs 59 and 60 below.

o. What Are the Options for Additional Hardware and Software
   Measures? As many reasonable options as possible should be
   identified and evaluated for cost-effectiveness. See
   Chapters 4 through 8 below.

p. What Are the Residents' Views on Various Security Measures?
   This inquiry should cover hardware and software measures.

q. How Does Security Relate to the Project's Financial
   Condition? The effect of security problems and remedies on
   both the capital investment in the property and the
   operating budget should be studied.

r. To What Extent Can New Security Measures be Financed from
   Sources Other Than the Regular Operating Budget? See
   paragraphs 57 and 58 below.

s. What Social Services Are Needed in Connection with Project
   Security? Existing social services should be evaluated, and
   an estimate made of additional needs. Specific sources for
   meeting those additional needs should be identified. See
   Chapter 7 below.

t. How Do Federal, State and Local Laws and Regulations Affect
   Project Security? See paragraph 8 above and subparagraph
   16e below.

14. EMERGENCY MEASURES. While thorough planning of the type
   indicated indicated in paragraphs 12 and 13 above will require
   considerable time, and is designed to produce a comprehensive
program extending over the long term, such planning by no means precludes short-term or even emergency action. Intrinsic to this process is the setting of priorities and target dates for phased actions. It should normally be possible to launch some short-term actions (particularly of the "Check" type) before preparation for longer-term actions (particularly of the "Cure" type) is complete. Where critical security problems create a need for emergency measures, it will be necessary to modify the steps outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13 above. Nevertheless, blind action is never justifiable, and some advance planning is always both necessary and possible, even in emergencies. Accordingly, the following points should be observed in emergency situations:

a. The maximum planning permitted by the circumstances should be undertaken in emergencies. At the least, a deliberate though rapid Management estimate of the facts should be made. Such planning steps as quick physical inspection of the property and consultation with the residents' organization and the Police Department should ordinarily not result in unacceptable delay.

b. To minimize the risks of hasty action, emergency measures should be limited to those which appear necessary to meet critical problems. Special caution should be taken in regard to measures which involve heavy expense, which are likely to be difficult to modify or which might cause undesirable "side effects." While this Handbook generally advises against a piecemeal approach, minimal "stopgap" measures may be the best interim approach to emergency problems.

c. Options should be preserved for different or additional measures after further planning. Limited emergency measures can be made consistent with orderly phasing of actions, as part of a well-planned comprehensive security program over the long term.

15. SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW OR RENOVATED HOUSING.
Where new construction or renovation of multifamily housing is contemplated, security planning takes on a special dimension. Here Management is not constrained by fixed physical conditions, but has many options to build in major security features at acceptable cost. In these situations, the following elements must be considered in adapting the planning process previously outlined:

a. Site Selection. For new construction, security planning should begin with site selection. HUD Site Selection
Criteria include provision for management analysis which would include security concerns. The site itself has major and sometimes irreversible consequences for long-term security. Subparagraphs 13d and 13e above are particularly relevant here.

b. Residents' Characteristics. In planning for new construction or renovation, Management is afforded unique opportunities concerning the selection of a new generation of residents. The first choice relates to the types of households to be accommodated--family or elderly, large or small. Unit size will affect the number of resident children, with probable consequences for security. After targeting the general market, Management should cause security concerns to be reflected in its tenant selection policy. See paragraph 44 below. Even if Management does not fully

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exercise its options in these respects, a thorough knowledge of the targeted market will at least let Management know what to expect as to security-related characteristics of prospective residents.

c. Design and Hardware. One of the most important security options for new or renovated housing lies in the area of architectural design and hardware. See Chapter 4 below. Preplanning offers unique opportunities to build in good security features at feasible cost, and the architects should have a thorough knowledge of specific security problems anticipated and the state of the art of architectural planning for security. See paragraph 19 below.

16. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPECIFIC PLANNING TASKS. Subject to the overall responsibility of Management, responsibilities for specific planning tasks should be clearly assigned to particular persons or organizations. For the small project, this will probably be a simple matter, but in all instances responsibilities should be clearly fixed and incorporated in the planning agenda suggested in subparagraph 12a(4) above. The following guidelines should be observed in this connection:

a. Central Responsibility. One specific person on Management's staff should be assigned central responsibility for security planning, even if an outside consultant is also retained to conduct the planning effort and regardless of what subsidiary responsibilities are assigned to non-Management participants. If Management has a Staff Security Specialist, that person would be the logical choice, but in any event the designated staff member should be an executive-level employee who is well-qualified to oversee a
comprehensive planning effort.

b. Planning Consultants. Particularly for a large project, it may be advisable to retain a qualified outside consultant to conduct all or a part of the planning effort.

c. Resident Representatives. The residents' organization should be requested to appoint one or more of its members to take responsibility for that organization's planning input.

d. Committees of Key Participants. Where an extensive planning effort is required, consideration should be given to use of a planning committee made up of representatives of the four key participants--Management, the residents' organization, the local Police Department, and local social services agencies. Representatives of other community organizations may be included if that promises practical advantages, but the committee should be kept small enough to function as an effective working body. The committee should begin its work after the preliminary estimate is written, and should continue to meet regularly, at least until a comprehensive plan is ready for implementation. If the committee proves valuable, consideration should be given to its continuation after the implementation phase begins, in order to assist Management with ongoing coordination and evaluation.

e. Legal Counsel. Management's attorney should become involved in the security planning process as early as possible -- ideally, before decisions are made rather than after legal problems arise. The attorney's involvement should ensure that all legal problems are avoided or minimized.