5. THE CONTEXT OF MANAGEMENT’S ROLE.

a. Comprehensive Approach. The best approach to residential security is a comprehensive one, and Management must find its role within this broad context. Comprehensiveness implies a complete response by Management and other key participants to all of the problems of crime and vandalism confronting the project and its residents. This response must take due account of the complex interrelationships among different problems and remedies. Coordination is essential, in terms of both the involvement of key participants and the various corrective measures employed. A comprehensive approach should aim for short-term as well as long-term action and, where critical problems exist, should include appropriate emergency measures. There will, of course, be practical limitations to the degree of comprehensiveness which can be achieved in each instance. However, to the greatest extent possible, a piecemeal approach should be avoided, for the very practical reason that it is likely to prove wasteful and ineffective.

b. Scope of Residential Security. Although there is general agreement as to the meaning of the term "residential security" in the setting of multifamily housing, that term is an elastic one and perceptions differ as to how far its scope should extend. No precise definition is attempted here, in recognition of the fact that there is a legitimate margin for differences of opinion. In each instance, Management, residents, and other key participants should feel free to determine for themselves the scope of their residential security concerns. The following considerations should be taken into account in formulating a working definition:

(1) Specific Types of Offenses. Residential security is usually defined in terms of the following types of offenses:

--Vandalism
--Assault
--Homicide
--Mail theft
--Rape/sex offenses
--Arson

--Burglary
--Robbery
--Automobile theft
--Purse snatching
--Drug abuse (sale/
distribution/use)

(2) Location. Residential security is ordinarily defined in terms of project boundaries. However, this delimitation is not always fixed in the perceptions of Management and
residents. Some offenses within the project may not be
viewed as security problems, while others beyond the
project's boundaries may be considered residential in
nature. In common usage, residential security focuses on
"stranger" crimes (i.e., where victim and offender are
strangers), with less emphasis on crimes among
acquaintances or members of the same family, even if
committed within project boundaries. Opinions differ as to
the extent to which crimes of fraud, the so-called
"victimless" offenses (e.g. drunkeness, drug use,
prostitution), minor disturbances of the peace and
infractions of certain project rules (e.g., parking
regulations) can or should be treated as security problems.
On the other hand, crimes on adjacent or nearby streets may
be seen as so closely associated with the residential
environment as to merit treatment as security problems of
the project itself.

(3) Illegal Access. Despite the usual priority concern for
restricting access to the property, residential security
cannot in most instances be defined simply in terms of such
restrictions. A "fortress" strategy may be an adequate
solution in housing for the elderly, but is apt to prove
infeasible in projects whose residents include a large
number of children. While protection of the individual
dwelling unit against illegal access is a basic
requirement for good security, it is more difficult to
enforce strict limitations on access to common interior and
exterior areas. In many family projects, much of the total
problem is attributable to offenses committed within common
areas by residents themselves, so that measures to control
access by nonresidents will not solve the problem.

(4) The Subjective Sense of Security. In the minds of
residents, Management staff, guests, tradesmen, public
service personnel, and others who have reason to be
concerned about crime and vandalism in the housing project,
the word "security" can evoke different concepts. The word
"security" can bring to mind the objective concern about
the real and obvious risk of crime and vandalism in certain
areas. It can also bring to mind, in other areas, the
subjective concern relating to the probability of crime and
vandalism where there is no actual known risk. For
example, residents may nurture extreme fears, particularly
with regard to violent crime, even though the actual danger
is remote. On the other hand, they may

feel tolerably secure in the face of a high degree of
genuine danger. Fear of crime (or sometimes the absence of
such fear) of itself constitutes a significant security
problem. Moreover, feelings of insecurity may reflect deep
anxieties about the individual's ability to cope with the
overall physical, social, and economic conditions with which he or she is confronted.

c. Types of Security Action. Where security problems are serious, and particularly in the large housing project, a comprehensive attack on crime and vandalism requires three types of action, as follows:

(1) Check. Directly deter or control the problem (e.g., prevent illegal access by hardware or policing).

(2) Treat. Address the surface causes of the problem (e.g., divert youthful energies from vandalism to wholesome recreation).

(3) Cure. Attack the root causes of the problem (e.g., provide economic and educational opportunities).

d. Applying Security Action. Action must be directed to each of these three levels simultaneously, with the goal of decreasing "Check" actions over time, while increasing "Treat" and "Cure" actions. However, "Check" actions tend to be prerequisite to substantial progress at the other two levels.

e. Key Participants. A comprehensive approach to project security requires the coordinated involvement of four key participants, during the planning as well as implementation phase. These four key participants are:

(1) Management
(2) The residents' organization
(3) The local Police Department
(4) Local social services agencies.

f. Roles of Key Participants. While arrangements may differ with circumstances, the normal roles of these four key participants, in connection with the three types of action described in subparagraph 5c above, are as illustrated in Figure 1(page 9). These functions must be mutually complementary. An absolutely essential requirement for solving security problems is the establishment and maintenance of strong operating links among these four key participants.

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for good security, tend to be susceptible of relatively short-term implementation, and are closely related to other aspects of Management operations.

b. Management's Role in "Treat" Actions. Although actions to address the surface causes of crime and vandalism ("Treat" actions) are a secondary focus for Management's role, there is usually much that Management can accomplish in this area and positive results can often be achieved within a short- to medium-term time span. However, outside resources and coordination with other key participants (especially local social services agencies) become more important for "Treat" actions.

c. Management's Role in "Cure" Actions. Management ability to attack the root causes of crime and vandalism ("Cure" actions) will vary greatly among different Management operations. Some large Management concerns (especially large LHAs) have in-house capabilities for delivering some types of services which go to the roots of criminal behavior, but in most instances primary reliance must be placed upon local social services agencies to provide such relevant programs as job training and placement, educational opportunities, family counselling, offender rehabilitation, health care, and help for the emotionally disturbed. Nevertheless, in one important type of "Cure" action -- improving residents' attitudes and standards -- Management can and should take a very strong role (see Chapter 6, paragraph 38 below). Long-term effort is usually necessary before measures of this type produce significant results, but all experts in law enforcement and criminal behavior agree that they offer the only really satisfactory solution to problems of crime and vandalism.

7. MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN PLANNING AND COORDINATION. Whatever role is developed for a particular Management with respect to the types of security actions discussed in paragraph 5 above, there are two areas of prime Management responsibility in connection with the security of its project. These are as follows:

a. Overall Planning Responsibility. Management should take the initiative in planning a security program for the project, and should exercise primary responsibility for carrying out the overall planning effort. Because of its controlling role, daily involvement, and long-term interests in the project, Management is in a unique position to take the lead in security planning. The plain fact is that, if Management does not assume this responsibility, none of the other key participants is likely to be willing or able to do so.

b. Overall Coordination. Management should take primary responsibility for overall coordination of the project's
security program. The same imperatives cited in subparagraph 7a above apply here. This does not mean that Management ought to attempt to perform, or even supervise, all measures, but rather that it should monitor the functions of all key participants on a continuing basis, and initiate such actions as may from time to time become necessary to assure coordination of those functions.

8. REQUIREMENTS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS. The laws of certain State and local jurisdictions impose upon Management special legal responsibilities for security, aside from HUD policy or other Federal requirements. These laws differ greatly from locality to locality, and are thus not susceptible to uniform description. Applicable State and local law may impose such special responsibilities, and such responsibilities (or their absence) constitute one important factor to be considered in defining Management's role in project security. Each Manager must consult its own legal counsel to determine the possible applicability of the following kinds of State and local requirements:

a. Housing Codes. State and local codes regarding requirements for elements of residential properties must be considered. Fire and safety codes sometimes prohibit measures which might be desirable from the standpoint of security alone. A few local jurisdictions have adopted codes setting minimum security standards, and this appears to be a growing trend.

b. Management Liability. In certain jurisdictions, the courts have held Management liable for damages attributed to its failure to provide protection against crime within the project. While there is great jurisdictional variation in the law on this issue, here again there seems to be a trend to greater Management responsibility for security in multifamily housing.

9. SUMMARY. The criteria for determining Management's proper role in project security can thus be summarized as follows:

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CHAPTER 2

a. Management's role should be defined within the context of a comprehensive approach to project security.

b. The coordinated involvement of the four key participants specified in subparagraph 5e above is essential to an effective residential security program, and Management's role must be assessed in relation to the roles of the other three key participants.

c. Management's heaviest involvement should be with direct protective measures ("Check" actions), with important but lesser degrees of involvement in measures which attack the deeper causes of crime and vandalism ("Treat" and "Cure" actions).
d. Management should take primary responsibility for planning the project's comprehensive security program, and for coordinating all of the elements of the program throughout the implementation phase.

e. State and local laws may impose legal constraints and responsibilities upon Management, affecting its security role to an important degree.