

P R O C E E D I N G S

11:53 a.m.

In the Matter of)	
)	
STEPHEN J. FERRY,)	
BETH AN FERRY,)	
)	HUDBCA No. 90-5228-D17
and)	Docket No. 90-1424-DB
)	
FERRY FINANCIAL, INC.,)	
)	
Respondents.)	

BENCH DECISION AND ORDER

Statement of the Case

By letters dated November 21, 1989, Stephen J. Ferry and Beth An Ferry, Respondents in this case, were notified that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development intended to debar them and their affiliate, Ferry Financial Inc., from participation in all Departmental programs for an indefinite period of at least five years on the grounds that they allowed funds from custodial accounts to be used to pay corporate expenses and for continuing to originate, fund, acquire, and sell FHA mortgage loans at American Mortgage Securities Exchange, Inc. (American) after American's mortgagee approval had been withdrawn.

Respondents were temporarily suspended pending determination of debarment. They made a timely

1 request for a hearing on their proposed debarment. It was
2 agreed that a bench decision would be issued pursuant to
3 24 C.F.R. Section 26.24(d) at the end of the hearing.
4 This is the bench decision in this case.

5 FINDINGS OF FACT

- 6 1. Stephen J. Ferry is the owner-operator of Ferry
7 Financial, Inc. He has been in the mortgage lending
8 business since 1967 and, until 1989, the vast
9 majority of his experience was with government
10 insured loans. He started Cal Home Capital in 1978
11 with his wife, Beth An Ferry, as co-owner. In 1984,
12 the name of Cal Home Capital was changed to American
13 Mortgage Securities Exchange, Inc. (American).
14 Stephen Ferry was the President and Chief Executive
15 Officer of American until August, 1987, when he
16 turned over the title and role of President to Robert
17 Joyce. Ferry thereafter held the title of Vice
18 President but took no active role in Corporate
19 affairs from August, 1987 until about January, 1989,
20 when he returned as an active officer. He had become
21 ill in early 1986 and was unable to do more than
22 part-time work as a loan officer, when he was not
23 hospitalized, until January, 1989. When Ferry
24 returned full time in January, 1989, Joyce continued
25 as President and CEO of American.

- 1 3. In September, 1979, American applied to HUD-FHA for
2 approval as a non-supervised mortgagee allowed to
3 participate in HUD-FHA mortgage programs. In its
4 application, American agreed to comply with the
5 provisions of FHA regulations and other requirements
6 of the FHA Commissioner. It also agreed to use
7 escrow funds only for the purpose for which they were
8 received and to submit an annual audited financial
9 statement prepared by an independent CPA within a
10 reasonable time following the end of its fiscal year.
11 American was required to maintain a net worth of
12 \$100,000 or more with assets acceptable to FHA to
13 continue as a non-supervised approved mortgagee.
14 American was approved as a non-supervised mortgagee
15 by HUD-FHA.
- 16 4. American failed to submit an annual audit report for
17 the fiscal year ending July 31, 1988 in a timely
18 manner as required by HUD.
- 19 5. Timothy Lafranchi, the independent CPA who had been
20 preparing annual audit reports for American since
21 1980, and who also had been preparing monthly and
22 quarterly financial statements of American, had
23 discovered, in preparing the audit for the fiscal
24 year ending July 31, 1988, that custodial funds held
25 by American through its loan servicing operations in

1 escrow for those purposes had been transferred to the
2 corporate account through an "in transit" transfer
3 and had been used to pay corporate expenses. The
4 custodial funds so transferred appeared to be funds
5 from mortgagors due to be paid to Freddie Mac by
6 American on behalf of the mortgagors. Although the
7 funds due to be paid each month to Freddie Mac were,
8 in fact, paid on time, the custodial account had been
9 depleted. As of July 31, 1988, the custodial account
10 was missing \$124,488. This was revealed on the face
11 of the audit report prepared by Lafranchi. The audit
12 report also showed, on its face, that American's net
13 worth was less than \$100,000. (Exh. G-2.)

- 14 6. Stephen Ferry found out, for the first time, as did
15 Beth An Ferry, that the custodial funds had been
16 misused on or after January 31, 1989, when a a copy
17 of the audit report was provided to Mr. Ferry and he
18 told Beth An Ferry about it. Stephen Ferry became
19 enraged that such an impropriety could have occurred
20 and planned immediately to take steps to cure the
21 problem with the custodial fund account and to get an
22 infusion of capital into American to increase its net
23 worth.
- 24 7. American was also a participant in HUD's FHA program
25 through which approved personnel of American

1 underwrote HUD-FHA loans. To be a participant in the
2 Direct Endorsement Program, a mortgagee must be
3 approved by HUD-FHA and is to have a net worth of
4 \$250,000. The \$250,000 net worth requirement had
5 been waived for American by HUD for the previous
6 fiscal year and Stephen Ferry believed that HUD could
7 and would waive both that net worth requirement and
8 the \$100,000 net worth requirement upon request to
9 HUD.

10 8. HUD's Office of Lender Activities and Land Sales
11 Registration sent an authorized letter to American
12 dated February 27, 1989, stating that American's HUD-
13 FHA approval was immediately withdrawn due to
14 American's failure to submit an annual audit report
15 and to pay annual fees. The letter also stated that
16 American's approval would be "reinstated
17 automatically upon submission of an acceptable audit
18 report and remittance of the annual fee within 90
19 days" from the date of receipt of the letter. The
20 letter further stated that American was to continue
21 its responsibilities "in connection with outstanding
22 HUD-FHA insured mortgage loans." It stated that the
23 withdrawal of approval would not affect outstanding
24 firm commitments, including construction loans under
25 the multi-family program. It stated that conditional

1 commitments, however, should be assigned to a HUD-FHA
2 approved mortgagee. For a Direct Endorsement lender,
3 which American was, it was given the option of
4 assigning such loan to an approved mortgagee or to
5 submit direct endorsement applications "now in
6 process for commitment processing" to the HUD field
7 office within five days. The letter finally stated
8 that HUD would accept no new applications for
9 commitments, other than those specifically described
10 in the letter, and would return pending applications.
11 The letter was signed by William M. Heyman, Director
12 of the Office of Lender Activities. (Exh.G-1.)

13 9. American received the letter withdrawing its
14 mortgagee approval on or about March 3, 1989. Both
15 Stephen Ferry and Robert Joyce immediately tried to
16 reach William Heyman to work out a plan by which
17 American could be reinstated. Their telephone calls
18 were not returned by Heyman until April 17, 1989, but
19 Heyman's staff was communicating with American during
20 this time period.

21 10. American immediately sent the audit report prepared
22 by Lafranchi and the required fee to HUD. Stephen
23 Ferry assumed that, as soon as he sent the report,
24 American would be "automatically reinstated" based
25 upon his understanding of the February 27, 1989

- 1 letter.
- 2 11. By letter dated March 10, 1989, HUD notified American
3 that it was unable to reinstate its approved status
4 because the audit report filed was not acceptable to
5 HUD. The deficiencies in the audit report that were
6 noted in the March 10, 1989 letter were that
7 American's net worth was only \$49,714, the diversion
8 of the custodial funds for company use, and the
9 listing of Ferry's home as an asset in exchange for
10 stock was a non-acceptable asset. The letter also
11 required further explanations of these matters and
12 remedial action. It was signed by Sandra Allison,
13 Director of the Lender Approval and Recertification
14 Division of HUD-FHA. (Exh. G-5.)
- 15 12. Between March 27, 1989 and May 1, 1989, Robert Joyce
16 wrote Sandra Allison and other HUD officials to try
17 to explain the matters questioned in Allison's March
18 10, 1989 letter. The underfunding of the custodial
19 fund account had been reduced to \$60,697 from the
20 sale of the servicing department, and those proceeds
21 were paid directly to Freddie Mac. Stephen Ferry was
22 trying to find an investor for American to bring
23 capital into the company to increase its net worth.
24 Ferry finally found an investor that he believed
25 would be acceptable to HUD and set up a meeting with

1 Heyman, Allison, HUD attorney Bruce Albright, Mr.
2 Ferry, the investor, and the investor's accountant.
3 Stephen Ferry believed the purpose of the meeting,
4 when held, would be to approve the investor and
5 reinstate American.

- 6 13. In response to Sandra Allison's March 10, 1989
7 letter, American submitted a revised audit report
8 which was not accepted by HUD because the net worth
9 requirement had not been satisfied. American then
10 submitted a re-revised audit report dated May 1,
11 1989, and a letter dated May 18, 1989 from its CPA
12 explaining answers to the questions raised by HUD.
13 HUD continued to determine that American could not be
14 reinstated because of the net worth problem and
15 notified American of its decisions in writing.
- 16 14. The letters written by Joyce to HUD, and the audit in
17 each revision, stated the trust, otherwise referred
18 by the parties in this case as custodial funds, were
19 used to pay corporate expenses. No explanations were
20 offered for why or how that occurred.
- 21 15. By letter dated May 5, 1989, the Mortgagee Review
22 Board notified American that the February 27, 1989
23 withdrawal letter was being amended based on the
24 diversion and improper use of mortgagor trust
25 (custodial) funds. American's approval was withdrawn

1 by that letter for a period of three years. The
2 letter was unequivocal and clear that American's
3 approval had been completely withdrawn. It made no
4 allowance for the continuance of any activities for
5 which mortgagee approval was required. (Exh. G-12.)

6 16. American was notified of its right to request a
7 hearing on the withdrawal of approval for three
8 years. It did so, but later withdrew its request.

9 17. The withdrawal of mortgagee approval remained in
10 effect at all times from March 3, 1989, when American
11 received the February 27, 1989 letter, until the
12 present.

13 18. During the time that American has had its mortgagee
14 approval withdrawn, from March 3, 1989 to about
15 October 1, 1989, it continued to underwrite, hold,
16 close, and transfer loans that were to be insured by
17 HUD-FHA. Both Stephen Ferry and Beth An Ferry were
18 aware of this and actively participated in it. The
19 only functions that Stephen and Beth An Ferry
20 believed American could not perform after its
21 withdrawal of approval were that, it could not
22 solicit new loans, it could not obtain an FHA case
23 number through the CHUM system, it could not request
24 an appraisal for a loan to be insured by HUD, and it
25 could not submit a file to HUD-FHA. Both Ferrys

- 1 testified that they continued to do business at
2 American exactly as before the withdrawal of approval
3 with the few exceptions described by Beth An Ferry.
- 4 19. American underwrote loans that were to be insured by
5 HUD-FHA through Jennie Gunderson, an approved
6 underwriter with American. American's other approved
7 underwriter refused to underwrite any more loans to
8 be insured by HUD-FHA after the withdrawal and
9 notified Stephen Ferry that she would be risking her
10 approval as an underwriter to do so. Nonetheless,
11 American continued to have loans underwritten and
12 Stephen Ferry never even checked with HUD or another
13 approved lender to determine whether underwriting was
14 a permissible function for a lender lacking mortgagee
15 approval.
- 16 20. Between March 3, 1989 and September 30, 1989, Golden
17 Pacific Mortgage Company (Golden), a HUD-approved
18 loan correspondent, originated a series of FHA
19 mortgages in its own name but the loans were
20 underwritten by American through the Direct
21 Endorsement Program. Golden assigned the loans to
22 American which, in turn, assigned the loans to Empire
23 American Realty Company, which became the assignee of
24 128 loans to be insured by HUD-FHA. Beth An Ferry
25 signed the documents assigning the loans to Empire.

1 On some of the loans, she also signed for American on
2 HUD Form 92900. Ferry Financial, Inc. was listed on
3 the Deed of Trust notes of at least some of the loans
4 as the trustee. Sometimes Golden closed the loans
5 before assigning them to American and sometimes the
6 loans were assigned before closing and American
7 closed them.

8 21. Beth An and Stephen Ferry had read or were aware of
9 the contents of the February 27, 1989 letter from
10 HUD, as well as the March 10 and May 5 letters.

11 22. After American's HUD-FHA approval was withdrawn, Beth
12 An and Stephen Ferry participated as officers and
13 employees of American in the funding, acquisition,
14 and sale of between 128 and 160 loans including the
15 sale of 128 FHA loans to Empire.

16 23. Stephen and Beth An Ferry stipulated that they knew
17 and understood that FHA approval was a statutory and
18 regulatory requirement for a mortgagee lender to
19 participate in the origination, funding, acquisition,
20 and/or sale of FHA loans. However, in their
21 testimony, they negated this stipulation by
22 testifying under oath that they believed at all times
23 that American could underwrite, fund, hold, assign,
24 and sell loans that were to be insured by HUD-FHA.
25 They testified that they believed that they were not

1 violating HUD requirements by continuing to perform
2 these acts after American's mortgagee approval had
3 been withdrawn. Stephen Ferry stated that he would
4 do essentially the same things today, under the same
5 circumstances.

6 24. HUD Handbook 4060.1, given to American when it became
7 a HUD-FHA approved mortgagee, makes clear that
8 approval is needed to submit applications for
9 insurance, purchase, hold, service, and sell HUD-
10 insured mortgages. It also makes clear that the
11 mortgages covered by the approval requirement are
12 those originated with an intent that FHA mortgage
13 insurance will be applied for, even if the mortgage
14 insurance certificate is not issued until a later
15 date. (Ext. G-31.)

16 25. Beth An Ferry never told anyone at Empire or Golden
17 that American was no longer a HUD-approved mortgagee.
18 Stephen Ferry did not tell anyone at either Empire or
19 Golden until Cheryl Jaster confronted him about that
20 fact in about May, 1989, according to him, although
21 Jaster denied having been told anything about the
22 withdrawal by anyone at American. I find Stephen
23 Ferry's testimony in this regard to be more reliable.
24 He assured Jaster that American was negotiating with
25 HUD and that he expected reinstatement within four to

1 six weeks. When Jaster checked back with him on
2 American's status in September, 1989, he admitted
3 that American was still not reinstated. Empire
4 refused to do any more business with American from
5 that point.

6 26. Both Ferrys believed that it was in the best
7 interests of their employees, and of HUD, to continue
8 to do HUD-FHA business while they were negotiating
9 with HUD to have American be re-approved. They did
10 not think that it was "hurting" anyone to do so.

11 27. Sometime subsequent to the reduction of the imbalance
12 in the custodial account, it was again used for
13 improper purposes and its imbalance increased to over
14 \$120,000. Stephen Ferry did nothing to correct this
15 matter other than to be very upset that it had
16 occurred again.

17 DISCUSSION

18 Debarment is a sanction to be imposed in the
19 public interest and the best interest of HUD.

20 Establishment of a cause for debarment does not, *per se*,
21 mandate imposition of the sanction and all relevant
22 mitigating factors are to be considered. The test for the
23 need for debarment is the present responsibility of
24 participants. However, a finding of lack of present
25 responsibility may be based on past acts.

1 Beth An and Stephen J. Ferry are principals
2 as defined in the regulations applicable to debarment and
3 Ferry Financial is their affiliate. These matters have
4 been stipulated by the parties. HUD may debar principals
5 and affiliates. I find that cause for debarment has been
6 established because both Ferrys, in their roles as
7 employees and officers of American, committed violations
8 of the terms of a public agreement in one or more
9 transactions so serious as to affect the integrity of HUD-
10 FHA's Direct Endorsement Program and its Unsupervised
11 Mortgagee Approval Program. These are grounds for
12 debarment under 24 C.F.R. Section 24.305(b). While I do
13 not find that either Stephen or Beth An Ferry knew or
14 should have known of the initial misuse of the custodial
15 funds, which are a category of escrow funds that may not
16 be used to pay corporate expenses, I find that they knew
17 about it when it recurred. Their accountant only
18 discovered it initially when doing an in-depth year-end
19 audit. The funds transfer was done in such a way as to be
20 difficult to detect. However, the problem recurred after
21 Stephen Ferry returned to work and he was made aware of
22 it. He asked Anita Domondon about it and she responded by
23 fleeing from his office. Domondon quit two days later.
24 Ferry always assumed she was the cause of the problem but
25 did not fire her because he dreaded the cost, financially

1 and psychically, of an employee lawsuit. He therefore did
2 nothing except express his distress to Robert Joyce when
3 the problem recurred and apparently did not give clear
4 directives that such fund transfers could not be done when
5 he found out about them initially. This was a failure of
6 responsible conduct that is to be expected from an officer
7 and owner of a HUD participant. It is appalling in its
8 helpless resignation from accepting responsibility. It
9 also calls into question Stephen Ferry's sincerity that he
10 understood how unacceptable this handling of funds was by
11 his response when it occurred again.

12 The more troubling aspect of this case is
13 the extraordinary continuation of business pretty much as
14 usual after the withdrawal of mortgagee approval. Both
15 Ferrys made a decision to conduct their business in this
16 matter because "no one was hurt" as they saw it, and they
17 were sure that HUD would reinstate them retroactively,
18 thereby making the 128 loans they sold to Empire insurable
19 by HUD-FHA. I find it absolutely incredible that they did
20 not realize that they were performing functions not
21 permitted of lenders without mortgagee approval. They had
22 the HUD Handbook and are bound to know and comply with HUD
23 rules and regulations. It was all there in black and
24 white. Even if the February 27, 1989 letter was somewhat
25 confusing and perhaps contradictory, it was still clear

1 that approval was withdrawn and what that meant. Any
2 questions in this regard certainly should have been put to
3 rest by the Mortgagee Review Board's letter of May 5. But
4 business continued as usual until Empire refused to buy
5 any more loans from American and it became clear that HUD
6 was not going to reinstate American or give pre-approval
7 to its investor. This was the height of irresponsibility
8 by the Ferrys. It was stupid. It was irrational. It had
9 no foundation in reality. It ultimately put Empire in the
10 position of having to resubmit the loans for underwriting
11 so that they could be issued insurance certificates by
12 HUD-FHA.

13 The impact on the direct endorsement program
14 and the mortgagee approval program was serious and
15 appalling. Government programs exist for a purpose. Net
16 worth requirements serve a purpose. Requirements that
17 funds be handled properly have a purpose. The Ferrys
18 never considered those purposes as important, from a
19 standpoint of the public or HUD, only their own need to
20 keep their business going. So they told no one about the
21 withdrawal, even those such as Empire and Golden that
22 needed to know about it, and continued to live in a dream
23 world where the government would forgive them their
24 trespasses retroactively. They also were never open with
25 HUD that they were continuing to do HUD-FHA business or,

1 they can be sure, they would have been facing both a
2 longer withdrawal and debarment much sooner.

3 Their attitudes at this hearing have been at
4 sharp variance with the stipulations entered on their
5 behalf. They profess ignorance of HUD rules and
6 regulations, quibble with them, and were generally
7 defiant. They have no more understanding today of why HUD
8 is so distressed with their conduct than they did the day
9 they received the withdrawal of approval letter. This is
10 a tragedy because the Ferrys had exemplary careers for so
11 many years. Nonetheless, I find that they are a poor risk
12 as participants in HUD programs based on their conduct
13 since March 3, 1989, which has been absolutely appalling
14 in its passive-aggressive wholesale violations of almost
15 every basic requirement for participation in the Direct
16 Endorsement and Unsupervised Mortgagee Approval programs.
17 Nothing in the record mitigates this conclusion. Their
18 beliefs in retroactive forgiveness as an excuse for their
19 total disregard of program requirements was absurd. In
20 fact, it's shocking. It was in no way responsible.

21 Stephen Ferry had the opportunity,
22 knowledge, and corporate position from which to prevent
23 these irresponsible acts. He did not do so and, in fact,
24 ratified them and participated in them. I find that a
25 four-year period of debarment of Stephen Ferry, at the

1 very least, is mandated in the public interest because of
2 the seriousness of the violations that he could have
3 prevented. What he did was actively subvert the purposes
4 of the mortgagee approval program and the direct
5 endorsement program, even after a warning from his own
6 employee responsible for underwriting in the direct
7 endorsement program. His professed concerns about his
8 business are disingenuous in this context. Inasmuch as
9 Stephen Ferry has been restricted from participation in
10 HUD programs since November 21, 1989, almost a year, I
11 will give him credit for that time, although it is clear
12 to me that he has learned little and made no progress
13 towards responsibility during this time. He shall be
14 debarred until November 20, 1993.

15 Beth An Ferry took a less active role in the
16 fateful corporate decisions after March 3, 1989, but she
17 knew of them and participated in clearly unallowable
18 activities after that date. A corporate officer may not
19 simply be like the three monkeys, covering their eyes,
20 ears, and mouth. To have remained silent about the
21 withdrawal to those she dealt with regularly at Empire and
22 Golden was not responsible. She, too, still is without
23 any real understanding of why what she did was a serious
24 violation that affected the integrity of departmental
25 programs. Therefore, debarment of Beth An Ferry is

1 warranted and necessary. However, because she went along,
2 rather than led, and was not one of the decision-makers in
3 fact, I find that a two-year debarment is warranted in the
4 case of Beth An Ferry. She has been suspended since
5 November 21, 1989 and will be given credit for that time.
6 She shall be debarred until November 20, 1991.

7 SO ORDERED October 31, 1990.

8 JEAN S. COOPER
9 Administrative Judge and
Vice Chairman
10 HUD Board of Contract Appeals

11 //

12 //

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2 JUDGE COOPER: Both parties have got a
3 right to request Secretarial reviews of this decision.
4 You have 30 days from today to request such Secretarial
5 review pursuant to 24 C.F.R. Section 24.713.

6 We will be in adjournment.

7 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing in
8 the above-entitled matter was closed.)

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25